Defence sources have confirmed that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is actively engaged in infrastructure development at multiple locations along the border, extending from eastern Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh.A defence source told The Times of India (TOI), “The infrastructure development activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are continuing at multiple locations along the LAC. In the east, for instance, it is happening in Rongto Chu and other valleys.”

Strategic Importance of Yangtse and PLA's Advancements

The Yangtse region, a strategically crucial area in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector, has seen increased PLA activity. India holds the tactical advantage by controlling the high ground or ridgeline in the plateau, allowing visibility over Chinese positions. To counterbalance this, China has undertaken several infrastructural projects.

As per defence sources, China has constructed a concrete road from Tangwu’s dual-use Xiaokang border village towards the LAC and upgraded dirt tracks to allow faster mobilisation of troops. “Apart from new military camps and the concrete road constructed from its Tangwu dual-use Xiaokang border village towards the LAC in the area, the PLA has also upgraded a couple of dirt tracks there to ensure it can ‘surge’ troops in larger numbers if required,” a defence source stated.A satellite imagery analyst, known as @NatureDesai on X, reported that China has been constructing two new roads in Yangtse during the winter months, including one from Lampug towards Tangwu, aimed at providing alternate connectivity and higher ground access to its troops. “It will provide the PLA an unobstructed view of Indian ground lines of communication in the area,” the analyst noted.

Official Indian Response

An official Indian Army source, when asked by TOI about China’s infrastructure expansion in Yangtse, confirmed that both countries continue to develop infrastructure along the border in accordance with existing agreements.

“Both China and India are undertaking infrastructure development all along the northern borders as per the guidelines enunciated in various agreements and protocols between the two countries,” the Army source stated.

He further added, “Any deviation from the agreements and protocols by the Chinese side, once observed, is being raised at appropriate levels during engagements through various existing mechanisms.”

Expansion Beyond Arunachal Pradesh

China’s infrastructure push is not limited to Arunachal Pradesh. Similar developments are being observed across the 3,488-kilometre-long LAC, covering the western (Ladakh), central (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh), and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh) sectors. Reports indicate the construction of new roads, bridges, helipads, and gun positions, with PLA troops remaining heavily deployed with extensive weaponry.

According to defence sources, the PLA is focusing on last-mile connectivity across Tawang, Naku La in north Sikkim, and other regions in the eastern sector. Areas such as Yangtse, Asaphila, and the Subansiri river valley in Arunachal Pradesh, which have long been under Indian control, continue to be friction points between the two armies.

Diplomatic Discussions and Unresolved Tensions

The latest diplomatic talks between Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Sun Weidong in Beijing focused on stabilising relations that have been strained since the military standoff in eastern Ladakh over four years ago. China reiterated the need to properly manage differences and ensure stability in bilateral ties.

During the discussions, both sides agreed to resume the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and reinstate direct flights. However, despite these diplomatic efforts, China has not yet agreed to broader troop de-escalation along the LAC.

The India-China border standoff has persisted since the violent clashes in Galwan Valley in 2020. While the disengagement process at friction points such as Pangong Tso and Gogra-Hot Springs has taken place, tensions remain in areas like Depsang and Demchok. The December 2022 Yangtse clashes further underscored the fragility of the situation.

China’s reluctance to de-induct troops post-disengagement has kept military tensions high, with both sides continuing to maintain heavy deployments along the LAC. While the October 2024 disengagement at Depsang and Demchok allowed the resumption of patrolling and grazing activities, broader de-escalation remains unresolved.